> ## Documentation Index
> Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://docs.wede.pt/llms.txt
> Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further.

# Proof: payments without network

> wede's own end-to-end test: payments captured without network, synced out of order and reconciled, with nothing lost and nothing counted twice

In wede's own test run on 12 October 2026, nothing was lost and nothing was counted twice. A payment terminal and a cash machine captured nine operations without network and synced them out of order. Every operation reconciled against the organisation's own records, or was flagged with the reason. 31 of 31 checks passed.

> [!NOTE]
>
> This is wede's own test, with wede's own test data. The terminals were simulated in software; the platform and every check were the real wede environment. wede never publishes, names or identifies its clients, their data or their use cases.

## The scenario

A payment terminal (POS) and a cash machine (ATM) of a test organisation kept working without network, then reconnected. Each operation reached wede between 2 h 19 min and 3 h after it was captured.

**1. Devices registered**

Both devices registered as hardware of the organisation, each with its own reconciliation source (terminal counter, ATM journal), plus a bank statement source. See [Devices](https://docs.wede.pt/concepts/devices.md).

**2. Captured without network**

5 operations on the POS (4 payments and 1 reversal) and 4 on the ATM (3 withdrawals and 1 reversal), each protected on the device with an integrity checksum.

**3. Synced out of order**

The ATM sent a reversal before the withdrawal it reverses. The POS sent its batch, then the same batch again.

**4. One message altered**

A captured message was changed after capture (50.00 EUR became 500.00 EUR) and sent with the others.

**5. The organisation's records arrived**

The POS counter, the bank statement and the ATM journal, with one value deliberately different and two records that match no operation. See [Reconciliation](https://docs.wede.pt/concepts/reconciliation.md).

## The results

| Question | Result |
| - | - |
| Was anything lost? | No. 9 valid captures, 9 operations in the ledger, one per capture |
| Was anything stored twice? | No. The batch sent again: 5 recognised as duplicates, 0 new |
| Was an altered message accepted? | No. Refused, kept out of the ledger, recorded as an integrity incident |
| Does each operation keep its origin? | Yes. Each one carries its device, its offline origin and the time it was captured on the device, not the time it arrived |
| Are reversals tied to what they reverse? | Yes, 2 of 2, including the ATM reversal that arrived before its withdrawal |
| Do the organisation's records agree? | 8 confirmed (7 by reference, 1 by value and time), 1 differs, 1 waiting for a record |
| Is the difference visible? | Yes. Statement 19.80 EUR against 18.90 EUR captured: both kept, the captured value unchanged, the conflict recorded |
| Are unknown records forced onto an operation? | No. 2 records without an operation are listed as such |
| Is there an audit trail? | Yes. 9 operations created, 2 reversal links and 3 batches of records, each in the audit log |

Totals as captured: 115.89 EUR in and 212.00 EUR out.

## What it means

An outage stops being a gap in the books. Operations taken without network come back whole, once, with their origin and their time, and they meet the organisation's own records by rule.

| For | What changes |
| - | - |
| A bank | Branches, agents and ATMs keep serving during an outage; the end of day reconciles against the statement and the ATM journal, with every difference shown |
| A processor | A batch replayed after a broken connection never counts twice; an altered message is refused before it reaches the books |
| A merchant network | Terminals keep selling without network within the limits the network sets; reversals find their sale whatever the order they arrive in |
| An auditor or regulator | Each operation has one identity and an audit trail; for production, a signed [continuity evidence pack](https://docs.wede.pt/compliance/evidence-packs.md) |

wede sets no limit of its own. Amount limits are the organisation's decision, set in its [offline policy](https://docs.wede.pt/concepts/offline-policy.md), and there is no maximum time without network.

## Repeat it with your own equipment

Run the same proof with your own devices and systems, in your own sandbox, and keep a sealed report. Production is never touched, and the report belongs to you.

**1. Open a proof run**

In the dashboard, open **Proof kit**, or call the API.

**2. Run your equipment**

With your sandbox key, go through the seven situations: capture without network, out of order, a batch sent again, an altered message, completeness, your own records and your offline policy.

**3. Finish and keep the report**

The report says, check by check, whether anything was lost, stored twice or accepted altered. A check you did not exercise is never reported as passed. Anyone with the report can compute its seal again.

> **[Proof kit](https://docs.wede.pt/concepts/proof-kit.md)**
>
> How to run a proof and read the report.

> **[Banking: payment continuity](https://docs.wede.pt/examples/banking.md)**
>
> The full integration for payment points and agents.


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